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 GENERIC FINITENESS OF OUTCOME DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
TWO PERSON GAME FORMS WITH THREE OUTCOMES∗
CARLOS GONZ´ ALEZ PIMIENTA†
Abstract. A two person game form is given by nonempty ﬁnite sets S1, S2
of pure strategies, a nonempty set Ω of outcomes, and a function θ: S1×S2 →
∆(Ω), where ∆(Ω) is the set of probability measures on Ω. This note proves
that if the set of outcomes contains just three elements, generically, there are
ﬁnitely many distributions on Ω induced by Nash equilibria.
1. Introduction
As Debreu (1970) argues, a mathematical model that tries to explain economic
equilibrium must have a nonempty set of solutions. In principle, one would want
the solution to be unique. However, models with multiplicity of solutions should
be allowed for, since they also provide a satisfactory explanation of equilibrium as
long as solutions remain locally unique. If the set of solutions is compact, local
uniqueness coincides with ﬁniteness of equilibrium points. When there can be
constructed models with inﬁnitely many equilibria, one can at best prove that
outside a small set of models, the number of equilibria is ﬁnite.
Harsanyi (1973) proves that for a generic set of normal form payoﬀs, the number
of Nash equilibria is ﬁnite (and odd). We can think of the normal form of a game as
being derived from an extensive form game, therefore, the space of extensive form
utilities is a linear subspace of the space of normal form utilities, and the generic
ﬁniteness in the subspace does not follow from the generic ﬁniteness in the larger
space.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) prove that for almost all utilities over the set of ﬁnal
nodes of an extensive game, the set of probability distributions on the set of ﬁnal
nodes (the set of paths) induced by Nash equilibria is ﬁnite. However, the previous
reasoning can be repeated again. Two diﬀerent ending nodes in an extensive form
game must be considered “equivalent” if they correspond to the same economic
outcome.
Consider a set of players N = {1,...,n}, ﬁnite sets of strategies S1,...,Sn,
a nonempty ﬁnite set of outcomes Ω, and a function θ: S → ∆(Ω), where S =
S1 ×     × Sn, and ∆(Ω) denotes the set of probability distributions on Ω. Utility
functions u1,...,un over Ω induce payoﬀ functions v1,...,vn over S that correspond
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to u1 ◦ θ,...,un ◦ θ. Therefore, we can talk about the induced normal form game
and about the set of equilibria of such an induced game.
The conjecture that for a generic set of utility functions u1,...,un the set of
probability distributions on Ω induced by Nash equilibria of the derived game is
ﬁnite, was refuted by means of a counterexample by Govindan and McLennan
(2001). Such a counterexample needs at least three players and six outcomes. In
a recent paper, Kukushkin et al. (2007) produce a new counterexample that only
needs two players and four outcomes.
Notwithstanding the previous negative results, we have available a number of
positive ones. When the number of players is equal to two, Mas-Collel (1998) shows
that for generic payoﬀs, there are ﬁnitely many pairs of expected Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs. Govindan and McLennan (1998) prove that in the space of zero sum
utilities (i.e., those such that u1 = −u2) and also in the space of common interest
utilities (i.e., those such that u1 = u2) it is the case that generically there are
ﬁnitely many distributions on Ω induced by Nash equilibria. For any number of
players, Govindan and McLennan (2001) also prove that the conjecture holds when
there are just two outcomes. Similar results have been proved that put restrictions
in θ.1
Most of the recent methodology used to tackle the problem relies on semi-
algebraic geometry. Semi-algebraic geometry has been proved a powerful tool to
analyze the structure of game theoretic equilibrium correspondences. Using this
methodology, Blume and Zame (1994) proved that, given an extensive form, for
almost all assignments of payoﬀs to ending nodes, the sets of sequential and per-
fect equilibrium strategy proﬁles coincide.
2 Govindan and Wilson (2001) provide
direct proofs of the generic ﬁniteness of Nash equilibrium outcomes for normal and
extensive form games. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) demonstrate that the set of
Nash equilibria of any game has only a ﬁnite number of connected components.
The positive results on the generic determinacy of the Nash equilibrium correspon-
dence contained in Govindan and McLennan (1998, 2001) also make extensive use
of semi-algebraic geometry.
The next section proves that if a two person game form has a set of outcomes
with just three elements, for almost all assignments of payoﬀs to outcomes, there
is a ﬁnite set of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria.
The result highlights that the counterexample given by Kukushkin et al. (2007) is
the minimal one in the sense that it uses four outcomes.
The three outcomes case is of some relevance since, typically, real life two person
games have this many outcomes: either one of them wins, or they tie.
1As a matter of fact, Govindan and McLennan (2001) show that the conjecture is true for
almost all θ’s. Also that if at all mixed strategies, for each player i the set of distributions on Ω
that agent i can induce by varying her strategy is (|Si|−1)-dimensional, then for generic utilities
there are ﬁnitely many equilibria. There also exist positive results for speciﬁc classes of games.
See for instance, De Sinopoli (2001) and De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2005) for voting games,
and Park (1997) for sender-receiver cheap-talk games.
2This result is stronger than the one established by Kreps and Wilson (1982). Kreps and
Wilson prove that for almost all assignments of payoﬀs to ending nodes, every perfect equilibrium




Figure 1. Indiﬀerence curves of a utility function over lotteries
representable by the expected utility form.
2. The Result
Consider two players indexed by i = 1,2, ﬁnite set of strategies S1, S2, set of
outcomes Ω = {a,b,c}, and a function θ: S → ∆(Ω). An assignment of payoﬀs to
outcomes is a point in
￿
RΩ￿N ∼ = R6.
Proposition. If the set of outcomes has just three elements, generically, the set of
probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria is ﬁnite.
Proof. Recall that the set of lotteries over three outcomes coincides with the 2-
dimensional simplex. It is represented by means of an equilateral triangle each of
whose vertexes represents the degenerate lottery where one outcome is assigned
probability one. Preferences over lotteries over three outcomes have straight and
parallel indiﬀerence curves that lie on this triangle.3 See Figure 1 for an example.
Consider the following result:
Theorem (Mas-Collel, 1998). In the class of two person game forms, for generic
payoﬀs, there are ﬁnitely many pairs of expected payoﬀs resulting from Nash equi-
libria.
Since the generic ﬁniteness of equilibrium outcome distributions holds for com-
mon interest and zero sum games (Govindan and McLennan, 1998) we can restrict
attention to the case where indiﬀerence curves of players 1 and 2 have diﬀerent
slopes. Given an equilibrium probability distribution on outcomes, the indiﬀer-
ence curves of both players that represent the expected utility coming from such
a distribution cross at just this one point. Therefore, generic ﬁniteness of pairs of
equilibrium payoﬀs implies generic ﬁniteness of equilibrium distributions. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 2, where, for a given two person game form with three outcomes,
only indiﬀerence curves over outcomes of both players that represent equilibrium
expected utilities are drawn. ￿




Figure 2. Generic ﬁniteness of probability distributions induced
by Nash equilibria for two person game forms with three outcomes
References
L.E. Blume and W.R. Zame. The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential
Equilibrium. Econometrica, 62(4):783–794, 1994.
F. De Sinopoli. On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality
Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(2):270–286, 2001.
F. De Sinopoli and G. Iannantuoni. On the generic strategic stability of Nash
equilibria if voting is costly. Economic Theory, 25(2):477–486, 2005.
G. Debreu. Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria. Econometrica, 38(3):387–392,
1970.
S. Govindan and A. McLennan. Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Dis-
tributions for Two person Game Forms with Zero Sum and Common Interest
Utilities. Technical report, mimeo, 1998.
S. Govindan and A. McLennan. On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome
Distributions in Game Forms. Econometrica, 69(2):455–471, 2001.
S. Govindan and R. Wilson. Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium
Outcomes. Econometrica, 69(3):765–769, 2001.
J.C. Harsanyi. Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: A new proof. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):235–250, 1973.
E. Kohlberg and J.F. Mertens. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Economet-
rica, 54:1003–1038, 1986.
D.M. Kreps and R. Wilson. Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica, 50(4):863–894,
1982.
N.S. Kukushkin, C.M. Litan, and F. Marhuenda. On the generic ﬁniteness of
outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms. Economics Working Paper Series
we073520, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Econom´ ıa, April 2007.
A. Mas-Collel. Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Payoﬀs for bimatrix games. Tech-
nical report, mimeo, Harvard University, 1998.
I.U. Park. Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-
Receiver Cheap-Talk Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 76(2):431–448, 1997.